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1. Reforms. 
The so-called "Bersani law", (l. 248/2006) concerned, among several other 
topics, the area of the legal profession. Particularly heated discussions arose 
from the modification of art. 22333 of the Italian Civil Code, which expressly 
forbade the so-called pactum de quota lite1. Legal science has offered different 
interpretations of this provision. In addition, the dissent is manifested not only 
on the desirability of such an innovation – before 2006, the Anglo-Saxon 
experience had already affirmed the utility of the contingency fee agreements 
for the “Access to Justice” of the most economically disadvantaged people2 – 
but especially on the true extent of it. 
It could be argued that the ambiguous reform3 has not determined a 
change of discipline4 (a ban of the contingency fee would remain through a 
more general ban on the sale of litigious rights, established by art. 12611 CC5); 
in contrast, the reform is also be considered to be a decisive step in the long 
 
1 Art. 22333 c.c.: «Gli avvocati, i procuratori e i patrocinatori non possono, neppure per 
interposta persona, stipulare con i loro clienti alcun patto relativo ai beni che formano oggetto 
delle controversie affidate al loro patrocinio, sotto pena di nullità e dei danni». 
2 G. C. Hazzard-A. Dondi, Etiche della professione legale. Un approccio comparato, Bologna 
2005, pp. 364-368.  
3 This is the new text: «Sono nulli, se non redatti in forma scritta, i patti conclusi tra gli 
avvocati ed i praticanti abilitati con i loro clienti che stabiliscono i compensi professionali». 
4 In this sense, see U. Perfetti, Patti e modalità di determinazione del compenso nella 
novella di cui alla l. n. 248 del 2006. La morte apparente del divieto del patto di quota lite, in 
“Contratto e impresa”, 23/1 (2007), esp. pp. 65-70; see also G. Scarselli, Il decreto Bersani e le 
tariffe forensi, in “Il foro italiano”, CXXX (2007), p. V, col. 25-26. 
5 Art. 12611, c.c.: «I magistrati dell’ordine giudiziario, i funzionari delle cancellerie e 
segreterie giudiziarie, gli ufficiali giudiziari, gli avvocati, i procuratori, i patrocinatori e i notai 
non possono, neppure per interposta persona, rendersi cessionari di diritti sui quali è sorta 
contestazione davanti l'autorità giudiziaria di cui fanno parte o nella cui giurisdizione 
esercitano le loro funzioni, sotto pena di nullità e dei danni». See F. Gasbarri, Brevi 
considerazioni sui fondamenti del divieto di «patto di quota lite», in “Giustizia Civile” XLVIII 
(1998), p. 3209; G. Musolino, Il compenso della prestazione professionale fra autonomia 
negoziale, tariffe e regole di concorrenza, in “Rivista del notariato” (2001), I, p. 85 ff. 
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history of the liberalization of that pact6, which in Italy was originally subject 
to penalties7, but downgraded to mere tort since the late nineteenth century8. 
These contrasting points of view – certainly dependent on the 
unsatisfactory technical choices made by the legislator in 20069 (and not 
entirely reconciled after the legislative intervention in 201210) – also reflected 
the difficulty in determining the precise boundaries of this legal figure. 
It is, precisely, this uncertainty draws the attention of the law-historian, 
who perceives the issue in the echoes of a centuries-old doctrinal labor, 
originating from the time of the medieval rediscovery of the Justinian 
sources11 and reaching to full maturity with the transition to the modern age. 
It was in occasion of this passage that the lawyers – who were already 
experiencing many difficulties in framing the afforementioned legal figure and 
frequent divergence of opinion – first attempted to offer various solutions 
which have remained substantially unchanged until today. 
Given these circumstances, it does not seem superflous to add a ‘vertical’ 
comparison – which attempts to reconstruct, albeit synthetically and 
partially12, the main developments of this legal figure in the age of the ius 
 
6 See P. Schlesinger, La nuova disciplina dei compensi professionali per gli avvocati, in 
“Corriere giuridico”, 4/2007, p. 452 f. 
7 Indeed, the contingency fee agreement, in the source that we will analyze, is included 
among the criminal behaviours (see infra, § 2).  
8 For the history of this agreement in the recent Italian tradition, see M.G. di Renzo Villata, 
Il patrocinio infedele in Italia tra Otto e Novecento (la norma e l'interprete), in Officium 
advocati, cur. L. Mayali, A. Padoa-Schioppa, D. Simon (Rechtsprechung. Materialen und 
Studien. Veröffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts für Europäische Rechtsgeschichte, b. 
15), Frankfurt am Main 2000, esp. pp. 279-287; see also R. Danovi, Compenso professionale e 
patto di quota lite, Milano 2009, pp. 11 ff. 
9 Detailed comments on the legislator’s lack of rationality in Schlesinger, La nuova 
disciplina cit., p. 451 f. 
10 V. infra, nt. 64. 
11 The starting point is to be found in some passages from the Digest of Justinian (Dig. 
2.14.53; Dig. 17.1.6.7; Dig. 50.13.1.12) e del Codex (C. 2.6.3; C. 2.6.5; C. 2.12.15).  
12 We cannot develop, here, for example, a proper analysis of the professional and 
patrimonial penalties arising from the illegal conclusion of the prohibited agreement. 
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commune 13  – to the usual ‘horizontal’ forms of comparison with the 
experiences of other contemporary legal systems14, is not superfluous,  
 
2. A look back at the past. 
For reasons of clarity, the present reconstruction will be based on the 
outcomes of medieval and post-medieval juridical thinking. In particular, the 
doctrinal pivot around which our reconstruction revolves is represented by the 
relevant contribution of Prosperus Farinaccius’ Praxis et Theorica criminalis15, 
that will be the object of the following analytical considerations. 
As for the choice of this author, it is known that, at the end of the 
seventeenth century, Cardinal Giovanni Battista De Luca, in his monumental 
and celebrated Theatrum veritatis ac justitiae, referred first of all, with regard 
to the contingency fee agreement, to the Roman criminalist and his Praxis16. 
Furthermore, if we think that Farinaccius did not represent the Idealtypus 
of the honest lawyer (as a consequence of his repeated malpractice, he had 
acquired a practical knowledge of the mechanism of the criminal justice ex 
 
13 See di Renzo Villata, Il patrocinio infedele cit., passim, and most especially R. Bianchi 
Riva, L’avvocato non difenda cause ingiuste. Ricerche sulla deontologia forense in età 
medievale e moderna, parte I, Il medioevo, Milano 2012, p. 90 f., 96 f., 164, 174, 186. 
14 See R. Cangiano, Il patto di quota lite negli ordinamenti italiano e statunitense, in 
“Mercato, concorrenza, regole” (2007), p. 255 ss. 
15 Biographical notes in N. Del Re, Prospero Farinacci Giureconsulto romano (1544-1618), in 
“Archivio della Società romana di Storia patria”, XCVIII (1975), pp. 135-191; A. Mazzacane, v. 
Farinacci, Prospero, in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani [= DBI], vol. 45, Roma 1995, pp. 1-5; 
Id., Farinacci, Prospero, in Dizionario Biografico dei Giuristi Italiani [=DBGI], Bologna 2013, pp. 
822-825. 
16 G. B. De Luca, Theatrum Veritatis et Justitiae, Lib. VX, pars II, Relatio Romanae Curiae 
forensis, Disc. LXVI, p. 163, lett. c. On this work, see A. Mazzacane, Giambattista De Luca e la 
“compagnia d’uffizio”, in Miscellanea Domenico Maffei Dicata. Historia - Ius - Studium, vol IV, 
a cura di A. Garcìa y Garcìa e P. Weimar, Goldbach 1995, pp. 665-671; on this famous italian 
cardinal and lawyer, see Id., De Luca, Giovanni Battista, in DBI, vol. 30 (1990), pp. 340-347; I. 
Birocchi-E. Fabbricatore, De Luca, Giovanni Battista, in DBGI, pp. 685-689; For the De Luca’s 
ideas about legal ethics, see S. Di Noto Marrella, Giudici e avvocati in “Lo stile legale” di Giovan 
Battista De Luca, in Miscellanea Domenico Maffei Dicata, cit., pp. 622-623. 
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parte patientis 17), we have a guaranteed insight which is unconditioned by 
moral prejudices. 
Thus, the work of Farinaccius, real practical and doctrinal kaleidoscope, can 
provide us with some useful suggestions to answer questions and remove 
uncertainties that still thickly surround the discipline of this agreement. 
Farinaccius begins the quaestio 106 of his Praxis enunciating the regula 
from which his reflection develops: «pactum de quota litis inter advocatum et 
clientulum, in casu victoriae est improbatum a jure»18, because – as he 
explains in accordance with the Justinian texts and the Glossa19 – it is 
concluded «contra bonos mores» 20. 
By reproducing the definition formulated by Jacobus Menochius in his De 
arbitrariis iudicum quaestionibus et causis (casus 522) he provides another 
important indicator to understanding the essence of the agreement under 
consideration, describing it as the covenant whereby «per modum quotae 
promittitur some pars rei, de qua lis est vel contentio»21: In other words, the 
agreement exists when the object of the remuneration is a part of the res 
litigiosa; therefore the compensation is subject to the victorious outcome of 
the dispute (Menochius stated that the reference to a share of the contended 
good always implies the victorious outcome of the dispute, even if the 
 
17 See Del Re, Prospero Farinacci cit., pp. 138 ff., 143 ff.; Mazzacane, Farinacci cit., p. 1; F. 
Cordero, Criminalia. Nascita dei sistemi penali, Roma-Bari 1986, pp. 342 ff. (quote 11). 
18 Prosperus Farinaccius, Praxis et theoricae criminalis ... Pars tertia ... [= Praxis], Lugduni 
1635, qu. 106, Pactum de quota litis, de iure communi reprobatum, et punibile est. Quando hoc 
veum sit, quando non, et generaliter de materia, n. 1. 
19 See gl. malo more, Dig. 50.13.1.12, De variis et extraordinaris cognitionibus et si iudex 
litem suam fecisse dicetur, l. Praeses, § Si cui (Digestum novum, seu Pandectarum iuris civilis 
tomus tertius ... commentariis Accursii... illustratus, Lugduni 1627). 
20 Praxis, qu. 106, n. 15. 
21 Praxis, ibid.; cfr. Jacobus Menochius, De arbitrariis iudicum quaestionibus et causis Libri 
duo..., Centuria sexta ..., Lugduni 1605, casus 522, Advocati, causidici et causarum 
sollicitatores de quota litis paciscentes, quibus poenis plectantur, n. 5. Biographical notes on 
Menochius in C.M. Valsecchi, Menochio, Jacopo, in DBI, vol. 73 (2009), pp. 521-524. 
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agreement did not mention it22). 
The highlighted condition appears closely linked to the ban ratio: through 
these agreements the lawyers, said Farinaccius, are induced to delictum 
calumniae since, knowing that they will get the reward only if they win, they 
will do everything possible, per fas et nefas, in order to achieve a favorable 
outcome23. 
This prohibition constitutes the conclusion of a long and difficult doctrinal 
debate: a dissensio dominorum – later largely resolved in the Accursius 
apparatus – on whether to ban a condition that does not exceed the dimidia 
pars litis, can, for example, be found, at the beginnings of the Glossators’ 
School24; and the idea of establishing an exception to the ban in the event the 
client agrees to offer, as compensation for the lawyer, a moderate share of the 
contended good is also expressed by the School of Orléans25.  
Since the time of the Commentatores, however, since «sive (...) faciat 
 
22 Menochius, De arbitrariis, ibid.: «Pactum autem de quota litis illud (...) esse dicitur (...) 
etiam si nulla sit facta mentio de victoria causae: quia hoc in casu sic semper intelligitur (...)». 
23 Praxis, qu. 106, n. 2: «Ratio regulae est, quia sic paciscendo advocati invitantur ad 
delictum calumniae, et scientes se nihil habituros, nisi in casu victoriae, facient quicquid 
poterunt per fas, et nefas, ut litem vincant». 
24 V. gl. immensa, C. 2.6.5, De postulando, l. Si qui advocatorum (Codicis... repetitae 
praelectionis Libri... Accursii commentariis illustrati, Lugduni 1627): «(...) dixit M.[artinus] quod 
liceat ei pacisci de dimidia parte litis (...), quod non placet secundum Hug.[olinum] et Azonem, 
et not. de hoc infra mand. l. si contra [sic = Dig. 17.1.6.7], melius quam hic». In the same 
sense, see also the late Glossator Odofredus, In primam Codicis partem complectentem I, II, III, 
IV et V libros Praelectiones (quae lecturae appellantur)..., Lugduni 1552 (rist. anast. Opera 
Iuridica Rariora, V, 1, Bologna 1968), Lectura ad C. 2.6.5, De postulando, l. Si qui advocatorum, 
n. 1-2. 
25 Jacques de Revigny [Pierre de Belleperche], iuris utriusque professoris subtilissimi Lectura 
insignis et fecunda super prima parte Codicis domini Iustiniani, ..., Parrhisiis 1519, rist. anast. 
Opera Iuridica Rariora, I, Bologna 1967, l. Si qui advocatorum, De postulando (C. 2.6.5), f. 
LXXVr: «(...) considerandum utrum sit conventio moderata vel non; quia sub quaecumque 




Italian Review of Legal History, 2 (2017), n. 05, pag. 1-14.  
Registrazione presso il Tribunale di Milano n. 227/2015 
Contatti: via Festa del Perdono 7 - 20122 Milano - segreteria@irlh.unimi.it 7 
pactum de quota litis, sive de certa quantitate, eadem est ratio» 26, the 
strictest principle that the pact «per nomina quotae nunquam valet etiam in 
centesima quota» 27 became firmly established. Farinaccius, recalling a similar 
statement by Menochius28, qualifies the prohibitive regula as a «sententia 
receptissima»29. Despite the concern to avoid extortion phenomena by the 
defenders in detriment of customers – Farinaccius warns in this regard that 
the doctores, according to the Justinian sources, also define the contingency 
fee as «derobatio et furtum» and lawyers who use it as «crudeles et 
depredatores»30 –, in the quaestio it is clarified that, for communis opinio, the 
pact would be illegal even if the compensation agreed was moderate31 or even 
minimal32. 
The reference to the ratio prohibitionis allows our jurist to extend the ban 
even beyond the limits mentioned so far. 
The prohibition exists, for example, as confirmed by the communis opinio 
doctorum, even if the pact is not established pro rata, but regards a 
determined good – a res certa – as long as it is in litem deducta, and for the 
reasons given above: even in this case, in fact, the transfer of good to the 
benefit of the lawyer clearly depends on the outcome of the dispute33. 
 
26 Bartolus a Sassoferrato, Prima in Digestum vetus..., Lugduni 1555, l. Sumptus, De Pactis 
(Dig. 2.14.53), n. 2. 
27 Baldus de Ubaldis, Commentaria in primam Digesti Veteris partem..., Lugduni 1585, l. 
Sumptus, De Pactis (Dig. 2.14.53), n. 1. 
28 Menochius, De arbitrariis, c. 522, n. 1. 
29 Menochius, De arbitrariis, c. 522, n. 1. 
30 Especially compare C. 2.6.5. 
31 «(...) Ita tenent omnes Doctores»: ivi, n. 25. Farinaccius promptly notes Revigny’s 
dissenting opinion as well: «Ad invaliditatem huius pacti, non solum requirit[ur], quod sit de 
quota litis, sec etiam quod contineat salarium immoderatum» (ivi, n. 26: cf. supra, nt. 27). 
32 Praxis, qu. 106, n. 27 (per le minoritarie opiniones in contrario, cfr. ivi, n. 28). 
33 Praxis, qu. 106, n. 29: «Si pactum non fiat de quota litis, sed de certa re in litem deducta 
(…) isto (…) casu urget etiam ratio prohibitiva pacti de quota litis (…) ita communiter tenent 
Doctores». Farinaccius remarks (ivi, n. 30) that an exception to the rule had already been 
identified by the Glossatores (see gl. immensa, C. 2.6.5, De postulando, l. Si qui advocatorum), 
in the case where the object of the pact was a «res hereditatis» (compare Jacobus Butrigarius, 
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The ban will then be extended to the agreement about something in litem 
not deducta. This conclusion – which the greatest jurists of the fourteenth 
century, Bartolus a Sassoferrato34 and Baldus de Ubaldis35 did not share (the 
latter would be criticized consequently by one of the last exponents of the 
School of Commentatores, Paulus de Castro36) – will be uncontroversially 
established in the modern age, with the important caveat that the prohibition 
exists if the res agreed is due only in case of victory37. 
On the other hand, the case in which a certain amount of money is owed to 
the lawyer, in the case of victory is more complex. 
In relation to this hypothesis, and on the basis of an almost inextricable 
 
Super Codice … Lectura, Parrhisiis 1516, l. Si qua [sic], De postulando (C. 2.6.5), f. LXIr: «Item 
quid si de una re convenitur cum esset quaestio de hereditate: ego punto quod valeat»; 
biographical notes in A. Tognoni Campitelli, Bottrigari, Iacopo, in DBI, vol. 13 (1971), pp. 498-
501) and the value did not exceed the compensation due to the lawyer (in this sense, also 
Revigny, loc. cit. supra, quote 27). 
34 Bartolus a Sassoferrato, l. Sumptus, De Pactis (Dig. 2.14.53), n. 2: «Sed ubi promitteretur 
quantitas simpliciter, vel res, non respectu eius quod in lite deducitur, tunc pactum valeret». 
35 Baldus de Ubaldis, Commentaria in primum, secundum et tertium Codicis libros, Lugduni 
1585, l. Si qui advocatorum, De postulando (C. 2.6.5), n. 2: «Secundo quaero, utrum possit 
conveniri de certa re, non de quota. Quidam dicunt quod est permissum. Credo contrarium in 
re litigiosa, sed in re quod non set in lite valet pactum». 
36 Paulus de Castro, In primam Codicis partem patavinae praelectiones, Lugduni 1546, l. Si 
qui advocatorum, De postulando (C. 2.6.5), n. 2: «In texto ibi certe partis. Dic: licet quote 
dimidie, tertie vel quarte. Certe etiam si non sub nomine quote, ut si erat questio de 
hereditate et pactus est de una re hereditaria cum sit eadem ratio. Secus si de alia re que non 
erat in controversia secundum Baldum. Sed salva reverentia, quia eadem est ratio 
prohibitionis, quia inducitur advocatus ad calumniandum. Dic ergo quod ubicumque pactum 
confertum in eventum victorie. Puta si vincam tibi hanc questionem volo habere tantum, si 
non vincam nihil volo habere, sed volo te iuvasse gratis: semper pactum est reprobatum 
ratione predicta, quoniam ut vincat utetur omni calumnia et falsitate, quibus poterit et 
conabitur per fas et nefas vincere, et ista fuit causa prohibitionis». 
37 Praxis, qu. 106, n. 31. Previously, among others, Menochius, De arbitrariis, c. 522, n. 7: 
«Tertio dicitur pactum de quota litis etiam, quando litigans promittit certam summam vel 
partem alicuius rei diversae ab ea, de qua est lis, adiecto tamen pacto, si obtinebit in causa». 
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mass of allegationes38, Farinaccius enucleates four distinct rules. 
Firstly, if the lawyer agrees to receive a certain amount of money, only due 
in case of victory, the agreement is illegal, even if the sum is moderate (we can 
notice, here, an overlap with the ‘ordinary’ hypothesis of the contingency fee 
agreement39). 
Secondly, if the amount is due in any case, provided that it is moderate, the 
pact is valid (therefore the fairness of the compensation with the work done is 
relevant in this case40). 
The third hypothesis, in which the compensation established is due in any 
case, but greater in the case of victory, is more problematic. It concerns a very 
old legal construct governed by Justinian sources41, especially popular, as it 
has recently been pointed out, in the Regnum Siciliae42; a construct which has 
survived until today: the so-called palmarium, which is in fact an additional 
remuneration, paid to the victorious lawyer. 
The medieval jurists questioned at length the legality of this additional 
remuneration and the discordancies were as numerous as those arising about 
the pactum de quota lite43. 
In particular, while in the Magna Glossa quite a favorable attitude was 
 
38 See Praxis, qu. 106, nn. 33-37. 
39 Ivi, nn. 38-39: «Prima sit conclusio, quod si promittatur advocato, seu procuratori certa 
pecuniarum quantitas in casu victoriae tantum, et prout dicunt Doctores, si vincas tantum, si 
non vincas, nihil, talis promissio sit in pactum deducta, dicitur illicita et reprobata (…) semper 
esse illicitum et reprobatum pactum, in quo advocatus conveniat, se velle habere tantum in 
casu victoriae; et si in caussa non vincatur, nihil (…). Et procedit haec conclusio, etiam quod sit 
promissa certa quantitas moderata; si enim, ut praefertur, fuerit promissa in casu victoriae, 
tantum adhuc nihil valet». 
40 Ivi, nn. 41-42: «Secunda sit conclusio, quod si promittatur advocato, vel procuratori certa 
pecuniarum quantitas uniformiter solvenda, tam in casu victoriae, quam in casu non victoriae, 
et sic sive vincat, sive perdat tantum, talis promissio sic in pactum deducta valet, et tenet (...). 
Verum haec secunda conclusio procedit, quando promissa quantitas est moderata habito 
respectu ad salarium sibi debitum, secus si est excessiva». 
41 See infra (quote 46) 
42 See di Renzo Villata, Il patrocinio infedele cit., p. 255. 
43 A detailed analysis of these distinctions in Praxis, qu. 106 nn. 43-45, 48-53. 
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expressed towards the palmarium (the scope of which, however, remained 
rather limited44), the institute would be the occasion of heated disputes 
among the most authoritative Commentatores45. 
Farinaccius, for his part, highlights a further distinction, already made by 
some medieval jurists, based on the fact that the stipulation of the palmarium 
– always depending on the favorable outcome of the dispute46 – occurred 
before or after the end of the dispute. Post litem finitam, the agreement on 
the palmarium is perfectly admissible47 (this solution is also contained in the 
Justinian sources48, and Farinaccius adds that even a hypothetical pactum de 
quota lite at this stage would be reasonable49). 
On the contrary, an agreement achieved lite pendente, according to some, 
 
44 See gl. immensa, C. 2.6.5, De postulando, l. Si qui advocatorum: «Praeterea nomine 
palmarij, id est, victoriae, licet ei aliquid pacisci: ut ff. de var. cogni., l. 1, § etsi nomine [= Dig. 
50.13.1.12]». The Roman law cited in the Glossa required, for the validity of the palmarium, 
the sum agreed to be moderate and, above all, the agreement to be concluded at the end of 
the dispute: «Si vero post causam actam cauta est honoraria summa, peti poterit usque ad 
probabilem quantitatem, etsi nomine palmarii cautum sit: sic tamen, ut computetur id quod 
datum est cum eo quod debetur neutrumque compositum licitam quantitatem excedat». 
45 Iacobus Butrigarius considered the palmarium valid if the agreement did not relate to a 
share of the value of the dispute (Iacobus Butrigarius, Super Codice … Lectura, l. Si qua [sic], De 
postulando (C. 2.6.5), f. LXIr: «Item quaero an in casum palmarij potest pacisci non de quota. 
Respondeo sic, quia non reperitur prohibitum»), but Bartolus vigorously contested the opinion 
of his former master, and denied the legitimacy of the agreement: «Quaerit do. Iac. nunquid 
sit licitum pacisci de quota litis, nomine palmarij, seu victoriae. Do. Iac. determinat quod sit 
licitum, cum non reperiatur in iure prohibitum (...). posses dicere contrarium, quia ea ratione 
qua reprobatur pactum de quota, vel de certa re (...), habet locum etiam in quaestione 
proposita, imo multo magis debet reprobari» (Bartolus a Sassoferrato, Commentaria in 
primam codicis partem..., Lugduni 1555, l. Si qui, De postulando (C. 2.6.5), in fin.). 
46 Praxis, qu. 106, n. 48. 
47 Ivi, n. 50. 
48 V. supra, nt. 46. 
49 «Pact[um] de quota litis fact[um], post litem finitam, (...) non videtur improbatum, quia 
cessat ratio prohibitionis huiusmodi pacti»: Praxis, qu. 106, n. 59. 
ROBERTO ISOTTON 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Italian Review of Legal History, 2 (2017), n. 05, pag. 1-14.  
Registrazione presso il Tribunale di Milano n. 227/2015 
Contatti: via Festa del Perdono 7 - 20122 Milano - segreteria@irlh.unimi.it 11 
although lawful, would not be honest50; according to others, eg. the jurist 
Raphael Fulgosius, it would even be comparable to a contingency fee 
agreement and therefore prohibited51. 
Farinacci, however, disregards this temporal distinction, expressing his 
agreement with the communis opinio 52 , and the general lawfulness of 
palmarium, even though under the condition that the agreed amount is not 
excessive53 (not exceeding, in particular, as established in the same Justinian 
text, 100 aureii54); he nevertheless points out that this limit is not traditionally 
set for criminal cases, especially those relating to capital crimes, in relation to 
which «potest salarium ascendere quantum partes volunt» 55. 
In the fourth hypothesis, finally, lawyer and client agree on a (moderate) 
amount of money in the case of a favorable outcome of the dispute, but 
nothing in case of an unfavorable one. In this case the agreement is valid, and 
the lawyer is always able to claim his salarium (according to the 
aforementioned lesson offered by Menochio56, the presumption established 




50 See, for example, Iacobinus a Sancto Georgio, Lectura aurea nusquam antea impressa... 
Codicis, Lugduni 1521, l. Litem, De procuratoribus (C. 2.12.15), n. 6. On this jurist, disciple of 
Giason del Maino, see G. Panciroli, De claris legum interpretibus libri quatuor, ed. Lipsiae 1721, 
p. 476. 
51 Raphael Fulgosius, In primam Pandectarum partem Commentaria, Lugduni 1554, l. 
Sumptus, De pactis (Dig. 2.14.53), n. 3. Biographical notes on this jurist in C. Bukowska 
Gorgoni, Fulgosio, Raffaele, in DBI, vol. 50 (1998), pp. 699-702.  
52 Praxis, qu. 106, nn. 48, 51. 
53 Ivi, nn. 45, 52. 
54 Ivi, n. 53. This limitation comes from an express statement of the Justinian source as well 
(see Dig. 50.13.1.12, in fin.: «Licita autem quantitas intellegitur pro singulis causis usque ad 
centum aureos»). 
55 Praxis, loc. ult. cit.  
56 V. supra, nt. 24. 
57 Praxis, qu. 106, n. 46. 
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3. Counter-reforms (and a conclusion sketch). 
The texts synthesized so far provide very precise information about the 
structure of the pactum de quota lite. The doctrine of the mature ius commune 
tends to consider the relevance of the contingency agreement to be much 
more extensive than the nomen iuris might suggest. Thus, any agreement 
which subordinates the remuneration to the victorious outcome of the dispute 
– and that tends, therefore, to implement a conflict of interests between 
individuals (lawyer and client) whose position within a judiciary dispute 
should, at least theoretically, remain distinct – is included in the scheme of 
that figure and a jure improbatum.  
In the recent past, the same result was reached, under the provision of the 
original text of art. 22333 CC, by Italian courts, which extended the ban of 
contingency fee agreements beyond its literal boundaries: a few years before 
the 2006 reform, the Supreme Court – guided by the need to «tutelare 
l’interesse del cliente e la dignità e la moralità della professione forense, che 
risulterebbe pregiudicata tutte le volte in cui, nella convenzione concernente il 
compenso, sia, comunque, ravvisabile la partecipazione del professionista agli 
interessi economici finali ed esterni alla prestazione, giudiziale o stragiudiziale, 
richiestagli» – determined that the ban contained in the standard had to be 
recognized «non soltanto nella ipotesi in cui il compenso del legale consista in 
parte dei beni o crediti litigiosi, secondo l’espressa previsione della norma (che 
costituisce, in relazione alla ratio della tutela, soltanto la tipizzazione 
dell’ipotesi di massimo coinvolgimento del legale e che, pertanto, non 
esaurisce il divieto), ma anche qualora tale compenso sia stato, comunque, 
convenzionalmente correlato al risultato pratico dell’attività svolta» 58. 
Therefore, the 2006 reform not only removed the prohibitive rule on 
Contingency Arrangements, but (despite the above-mentioned conservative 
interpretations of the doctrine) produced a Copernican revolution in the 
regulation of the professional relationship between lawyer and client, 
 
58 Cass. 19.11.1997, n. 11485, in «Giust. Civ.», 48 (1998), p. 3207 ff., annotated by Gasbarri 
(v. supra, nt. 6). 
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removing, in the name of free competition and of greater access to justice, 
limits that represented a real centuries-old taboo. 
This is what has been established in a more recent judgment of the 
Supreme Court, which has expressly stated that «Il patto di quota litis (...) è 
oggi consentito», because the law 248/2006 «nell’abrogare e sostituire il 
comma 3 dell’art. 2233 c.c., ha attuato il principio comunitario della libera 
concorrenza e della più ampia circolazione delle persone e dei servizi, nella 
prospettiva di assicurare agli utenti un’effettiva facoltà di scelta dei 
professionisti, nell’esercizio dei propri diritti e di comparazione delle 
prestazioni offerte sul mercato» 59. 
However the taboos have a long-lasting life. A few weeks after the 
aforementioned judgment, the legislator abruptly retraced his steps: in the 
new Law on the Legal Profession (l. 247/2012), the provision reaffirming the 
freedom of determination of fees and allowing their determination «a 
percentuale sul valore dell’affare o su quanto si prevede possa giovarsene, non 
soltanto a livello strettamente patrimoniale, il destinatario della 
prestazione»(art. 133), has (contradictorily) reintroduced the ban of the 
contingency fee agreement (art. 134) 60  that seemed finally outdated; 
reiterated in the new Code of Conduct for Lawyers61, it has provided material 
for new theoretical and judicial efforts of coordination62 and it has, so to 
 
59  Cass. Civ., Sez. Unite, 10/08/2012, n. 14374 (see the website 
www.italgiure.giustizia.it/sncass/). 
60 «Sono vietati i patti con i quali l’avvocato percepisca come compenso in tutto o in parte 
una quota del bene oggetto della prestazione o della ragione litigiosa». 
61 Code of Conduct for Lawyers (amended by Resolution CNF 31/1/2014, in Gazzetta 
Ufficiale 16/10/2014, n. 241), art. 252. 
62 The main difficulty consists in distinguishing between the agreement which provides for 
a fee established in proportion to the expected results (lawful) and the one which relates to a 
share of the good in dispute (prohibited). 
 On this point, see G. Conte, La tormentata disciplina del “patto di quota lite” e le 
equivoche novità introdotte con la riforma forense, in “Contratto e impresa”, 29/4-5 (2013), 
pp. 1109-1121 (in part. p. 1117 s.). Recently, also the Supreme Court, reproducing verbatim a 
decision of the Consiglio Nazionale Forense (Sent. 18/03/2014, n. 26 – see the website 
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speak, turned the clock of history back to the doctrine of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries63. 
Clearly, we do not intend to express an opinion on legislative choices: it is 
not easy to establish whether, in this delicate matter, the reasons of 
competition, of the market and of the access to justice should prevail or 
whether, on the contrary, the concerns related to the defender’s loss of 
impartiality or, even worse, to the possibility of his illegal ploys at the expense 
of the client, should be deemed more relevant64. 
Our intention is, however, to highlight the conclusion of the reflections 
carried out so far, the inability to escape the Manichean oscillation between 
the polarities of unconditional liberalization and absolute prohibition. 
If this finding contradicts the well-known motto that we have placed in the 
epigraph and allows, sometimes, the unexpected recovery of entire law 
libraries, it inevitably prevents a solution of the problems perhaps more 
difficult and complex, yet more balanced and modern. 
 
cnf.ipsoa.it), fixed that «la percentuale può essere rapportata al valore dei beni o degli 
interessi litigiosi, ma non al risultato, in tal senso deve interpretarsi l’inciso “si prevede possa 
giovarsene” che evoca un rapporto con ciò che si prevede e non con ciò che costituisce il 
consuntivo della prestazione professionale. Questa interpretazione (...) ha dalla sua, oltre che 
la conformità al dato letterale, anche la coerenza con la ratio del divieto, dal momento che 
accentua il distacco dell’avvocato dagli esiti della lite, diminuendo la portata dell’eventuale 
commistione di interessi quale si avrebbe se il compenso fosse collegato, in tutto o in parte, 
all’esito della lite, con il rischio così della trasformazione del rapporto professionale da 
rapporto di scambio a rapporto associativo» (Cass. Civ., Sez.Unite, 25/11/2014, n. 25012 (see 
the website www.italgiure.giustizia.it/sncass/).  
63 Even if, after the reform of 2006, U. Carnevali noted: «Sulla storia, sulle ragioni del 
divieto [del patto di quota lite], sugli argomenti addotti pro o contro di esso, non mette conto 
di soffermarsi, dal momento che esso appartiene ormai alla storia» (Compenso professionale e 
autonomia privata. Il patto di quota lite: probemi civilistici, in Compenso professionale e patto 
di quota lite, a cura di R. Danovi, Milano 2009, p. 1 f.) 
64 It is very difficult to determine whether, in the current socio-economic context, it is 
always the client to embody the role of the weaker party, but this is not the appropriate place 
to resolve this issue. 
